Logical Dissipation of Automata Implements - Dissipation of Computation by Matherat, Philippe & Jaekel, Marc-Thierry
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
98
05
01
8v
1 
 7
 M
ay
 1
99
8
Logical dissipation of automata implements - Dissipation of computation
Philippe Matherata and Marc-Thierry Jaekelb
a Ecole Nationale Supe´rieure des Te´le´communications, CNRS,
46, rue Barrault, F75013 Paris
b Laboratoire de Physique The´orique de l’Ecole Normale Supe´rieure, CNRS, UPS
24 rue Lhomond F75231 Paris Cedex 05
(LPTENS 98/17A)
English translation of:
Dissipation logique des imple´mentations d’automates - Dissipation du calcul
(Technique et Science Informatiques 15 (1996) 1079)
As revealed by discussions of principle on energy dissi-
pation by computers, logic imposes constraints on phys-
ical systems designed for a logical function. We define a
notion of logical dissipation for a finite automaton. We
discuss the constraints associated with physical imple-
mentation of automata and exhibit the role played by
modularity for testability. As a result, practical comput-
ers, which are necessarily modular, dissipate proportion-
ally to computation time.
Keywords: physical implementation of automata,
Maxwell demon, graphs of automata and modularity,
Turing machine, dissipation of computation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Finite automata are mathematical objects, while the
notion of dissipation has its origin in the second prin-
ciple of thermodynamics and refers to physical systems.
On one hand, automata are defined in a logical context
where states are successive in the sense of natural num-
bers and are not successive in time. On another hand,
the evolution of an arbitrary physical system cannot be
reduced to transitions between the states of a finite au-
tomaton. Nevertheless, implementation of automata un-
der the form of physical systems meets constraints which
logic imposes on physics, and conversely.
A physical system, whether it exists spontaneously or
it has been set up by an experimentalist, is a set of ele-
ments which obey dynamical laws. Its evolution can be
described by initial conditions and the laws of motion.
The possibility for the evolution to take the form of a
finite set of states related by transitions is not left to the
physicist’s choice. However, in a great number of prac-
tical situations, the physical system under study is not
imposed on the experimentalist but, on the contrary, is
designed, built and verified by the experimentalist him-
self. When one designs a machine, one chooses the part
which will be played by macroscopic degrees of freedom.
If one chooses to let a piston move within two extreme
positions, one will set the necessary material to insure
proper steering, and one will a priori reject all products
which would not insure a satisfactory rigidity or would
suffer from too early weariness. Similarly, a designer of
electronic logical devices looking for the implementation
of an automaton will work to impose the logical func-
tion and will reject all arrangements which do not show
sufficient reliability.
The question of the existence of a physical implement
realising a given logical function, in a reliable and stable
manner, has no evident answer. It leads to the ques-
tion of the proof of a physical device. One needs to get
convinced that the physical object will effectively realise
the assigned function in all configurations of use and will
continue to realise it in the future. This is in general
guaranteed by a test which verifies that the physical ob-
ject behaves as its logical definition requests.
Let us admit that such implements of automata do
exist and that they do not reduce to ordinary physical
systems. We shall try to exhibit their characteristic prop-
erties.
To the category of machines realising a function cho-
sen by the experimentalist belong many physicist’s in-
struments, many measurement devices. The fundamental
laws of physics are observed by means of devices whose
functions which have been assigned must be describable
in logical terms. Thus, even if physical systems cannot be
reduced to automata, experimentation on physical sys-
tems necessarily involves automata.
We shall not raise here the general question of the re-
lation between the structure of logical language and the
form of physical laws. We shall rather study the con-
straints which are imposed (by their logical function) on
physical systems which are implements of a finite and de-
terministic automaton or of a deterministic Turing ma-
chine, particularly in relation with the question of dissi-
pation.
A. History
We very briefly recall here the essential steps which
underlined the relation between computation and dissi-
pation. A detailed bibliography can be found in [1].
The first example of an automaton taking part in a
physical process was introduced by Maxwell, in relation
with the statistical character of the second principle of
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thermodynamics [2].
Taking over the analysis of Maxwell demon, Szilard
made it precise that such a physical device, which memo-
rizes information, must also dissipate, otherwise it would
allow to build a perpetual motion of the second kind [3].
By relying on the second principle of thermodynamics,
he computed that a one-bit memory, hence a two-state
automaton, such that its two memory states correspond
to entropy increases S1 and S2 must satisfy:
e−
S1
k + e−
S2
k ≤ 1
with k Boltzmann constant (1.38 10−23 Joules/Kelvin).
This result is established by reasoning over a complete
cycle of a mono-thermal machine made of a perfect gas
and one memory.
Some authors attributed tomeasurement (initialisation
of the memory) the origin of this dissipation (Gabor [4],
Brillouin [5]), while Landauer preferred to locate the lat-
ter in the erasure (forgetting of previously memorized
information) [6]. Although both interpretations seem op-
posite we shall show in section V that this is not the case
for finite automata.
Reinterpreting Szilard, Brillouin suggests a generalised
Carnot principle reading ∆(S−I) ≥ 0 where S stands for
entropy and I for information, both in the same unit. In
the opposite way, Landauer suggests that a system which
memorizes one bit of information at temperature T must
dissipate an energy of the order of at least kT ln2 for each
bit erasure, whatever its physical realisation (mechanical,
electronic, etc...) [6]. This point of view insists on the
general character of the minimal dissipation, related to
the logical function, even if the effectively dissipated en-
ergy may depend on choices which have been made in the
physical realisation of the memory. This ”Landauer prin-
ciple” (as was called later by Bennett) focuses on logical
irreversibilities: a device which does not insure logical
reversibility should not pretend to physical reversibility.
These two principles (Brillouin and Landauer) thus
shift, each in its way, the discussion of dissipation, from
the domain of physics to the domain of logics. They
suggest to use a notion of logical dissipation, measured
by the quantity of lost information, which could then be
transposed to the domain of physics under the form of a
minimal energy dissipation.
Landauer priniciple, which we shall rather call crite-
rion, has never been confronted to experiments, due to
the smallness of the invoked dissipated energy. It is, at
ordinary temperature, smaller by many orders of magni-
tude than the energy effectively dissipated by the best de-
vices presently existing, which leads to think that ”Lan-
dauer dissipation” is screened by more important dissi-
pative effects whose origin is still not well understood.
Discussions of principle also show that its expression can
only be approximate, and must in particular be ques-
tioned at very low temperatures (see for instance [7]).
Following Landauer, Bennett then showed that with
any Turing machine S one can associate a Turing ma-
chine R, which performs the same computations as S,
but which furthermore memorizes the history of the com-
putation, then erases this history, the whole being done
in a logically reversible way. He deduced that any com-
putation can be performed with a dissipation which is
not related to the number of steps in the computation,
but to the length of the result only [8].
Here, we shall not discuss the validity or the physi-
cal evaluation of Landauer criterion, but we shall study
the properties of logical dissipation. Although defined
logically, this dissipation characterises physical systems.
Thus, we shall show that the constraints on physical
realisations of information systems induced by the ne-
cessity of testability impose particular logical structures
which result in their logical dissipation. We shall see
that Bennett’s construction, even if it permits the log-
ical reversibility of any computation, does not provide
a non-dissipative implement that one can exhibit explic-
itly before the beginning of the computation (which does
not depend on the particular computation). For univer-
sal reversible machines, the constraints associated with
physical implementation lead to dissipative realisations.
B. Plan
The notions of finite automaton and logical dissipation
should first be made precise. The existence of this last
notion is implicitly assumed in Brillouin and Landauer
considerations, but no definition has been given up to
now.
We shall discuss the physical implementation of au-
tomata. Contrarily to the automaton which is defined
formally, its physical realisation must satisfy further con-
straints so that to ensure its logical function. It should in
particular allow to check that the physical object effec-
tively performs its function. We shall restrict ourselves
to physical objects whose function can be tested and does
not evolve in time.
We shall then introduce the notion of modularity for an
automaton implementation. Modular structures allow to
considerably simplify the test of implements and thus to
realise automata of a very high complexity. We shall
show that a counterpart is that these implementations
lead to dissipation.
Finally, we shall discuss the possibilities of physical im-
plementations of deterministic Turing machines and their
dissipation. We shall show that the implements of com-
puting machines dissipate proportionally to computation
time.
II. FINITE AUTOMATA
Finite automata can be used in various contexts [9].
When they are used to define a language, their states are
not comparable with the states of a physical system. On
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another hand, when they are used to describe a sequential
electronic device, a state of the mathematical automaton
corresponds to a stable physical state of the electronic
device, and transitions of the mathematical automaton
correspond to physical transitions which are ordered in
physical time. In such a situation, every transition is a
validation of the preceding input chain which has led to
this state. It is this second point of view that we shall
adopt.
Our definition of an automaton will remain very close
to classical definitions, but it shall differ on certain
points, in order to allow for a definition of the notions
of convergence and divergence. We shall try to use the
ordinary vocabulary as much as possible (see for instance
[10] or [11]).
We shall see the automaton as a black box (figure 1).
Inputs are stimuli (S) from the exterior world. Outputs
are responses (R) directed to the exterior world. The
different allowed values for S are in finite number (sym-
bols chosen in a finite alphabet). And similarly for R
(the alphabets are in general distinct, i.e. with different
numbers of symbols for S and R).
State Q
Automaton:
Black box
OutputInput
S R
Figure 1. Finite automaton
To denote the successive values of the internal state Q
of the automaton, and the successive values of inputs and
outputs alike, we shall use an index t (time) taking inte-
ger values. For the moment, this is not the physical time,
as succession refers to natural numbers only. When phys-
ical implements will be defined, the index t will become
a discrete physical time (rhythmed by a clock exterior to
the automaton).
The automaton evolution is described by the two fol-
lowing functions F and G:
Qt+1 = G(Qt, St)
Rt = F (Qt)
where Qt, St and Rt denote the state, the input stimuli
and the output responses of the automaton, at time t. G
is called the transition function.
We shall use a graphic representation for G, which as-
sociates a circle with each state and an arrow with each
state transition (figure 2), and which we shall call the
state diagram or the graph of the automaton.
S
Q Q′
Figure 2. A transition
By requiring that G be a function we shall restrict
ourselves to deterministic automata.
In our definition of function F , the response Rt only
depends on the state Qt. Consequently, a change of input
can only modify the output at the following time, and
through a change of state. This definition means that all
information available on the output lies in the state of
the automaton. This we shall call a sequential function.
For simplicity, F will be required to be injective. The
exterior world will know the instantaneous state of the
automaton through the instantaneous value of the re-
sponse. This will simplify the test of a physical imple-
ment of the automaton.
The chain of input symbols will be called input word,
and the ouput chain ouput word alike. Their length can
be infinite if the state diagram contains a loop (allows to
return to a state already visited).
A. Divergence and convergence
First of all, the arrows leaving a same state will be im-
posed to arrive at different states. If two different sym-
bols A and B trigger a same transition from state Q to
state Q′, then this transition will be said to be triggered
by label ”AorB”, and only one arrow will appear on the
state diagram (figure 3). Thus, state diagrams will not
be multigraphs, but oriented and labelled graphs.
AorB
Q′
Q
Q′
Q
B
A
Figure 3. Only one arrow from state Q to state Q′
Definition: when at least two transitions start from a
same state (thus corresponding to different input values
and ending at different states), we shall say that there is
a divergence.
Remark: in absence of divergence, there are two pos-
sibilities:
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- indifferent input: the environment provides some in-
put, but the automaton makes the same transition what-
ever the value of this input; the transition will be labelled
by the set of all possible input values.
- implicit input: the automaton waits for a particular
input value, and the environment can only provide this
value.
In following discussions, both cases will be equivalent.
Definition: when at least two transitions end at the
same state, we shall say that there is a convergence.
Definition: an automaton is said to be reversible if
and only if its graph does not contain any convergence.
Remark: equivalence between reversibility and absence
of convergence is only compatible with a function F de-
fined such that a change of response only occurs as a
consequence of a change of state. All information on the
past evolution of the automaton lies in its internal state.
If the state is reached through a convergence, some in-
formation on the past evolution of the automaton is lost.
To compare with definitions used in [11], we shall con-
sider that:
- all states are acceptant: this property allows logical
states to become stable physical states. All performed
transitions are successful.
- there is no reject state: the transition function is only
a partial function, which means that for some states some
symbols may not trigger a transition. In this case, such
symbol will be forbidden as input at that time. Defini-
tions of automata which involve a reject state lead to a
number of arrows leaving each state which may be higher.
Thus, more states may be sources of divergences, a situ-
ation which we shall not allow.
The automaton is compatible with a class of environ-
ments only, those which provide as stimuli only words
which are compatible with a path in the graph of the
automaton (a computation). The definition of the au-
tomaton entails the definition of the class of compatible
environments. For physical implements of automata, this
will lead to exclude physical environments which are not
compatible with the definition of the automaton.
III. PHYSICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF
AUTOMATA
We wish to establish a correspondence between the
states of the logical automaton and stable states of a
physical system, and to make the transitions of the logi-
cal automaton correspond to physical transitions.
We shall exclude automata which are defined by a re-
cursive formula and whose finite character may thus be
undecidable (the eventuality of such a situation will be
discussed in section VIII). Moreover, only automata will
be considered whose definition leads to a graph which is
stable in time.
The ”black box” of figure 1 now becomes a physical
object. Input and output become channels for commu-
nicating with the environment. Time becomes physical.
Physical time being not discrete, we shall assume here
that it can be discretised by means of an external clock,
which sends pulses on an additional input channel of the
automaton (CK on figure 4). Stimuli must also be as-
sumed to be synchronised with the clock, a further con-
straint imposed by the automaton on its environment.
The clock pulses trigger internal transformations of the
automaton and we shall assume that after some delay,
shorter than a clock period, the physical state becomes
stable, in such a manner that it can represent one of the
logical states of the automaton. This does not require a
physical state which does not evolve, but entails a definite
correspondence with a single logical state.
synchronised
on CK
Input
S
Black box
State Q
R
CK
Output
Automaton:
Figure 4. Physical implement of an automaton
A. Existence
Such a physical system is not an object to be investi-
gated once its existence has been recognised, but on the
contrary an object which has been described by its func-
tion before any knowledge of its existence, of its compat-
ibility with fundamental properties of physical systems,
which may impose further limitations.
We shall assume that such physical implements of au-
tomata do exist (taking possible constraints of implemen-
tation into account) and shall study the consequences of
our definitions. If only a reduced class of physical ob-
jects does comply with the definitions and implementa-
tion constraints, we shall know that these consequences
apply to this reduced class only.
We shall be guided by the existence of electronic log-
ical devices (mainly computing machines) which do be-
have as such objects, with the usual constraints of im-
plementation and use: on electric power supply, tem-
perature, allowed values for inputs, fan-in and fan-out,
clock synchronisation of inputs, etc... These constraints
are quoted only to indicate what may determine the exis-
tence, without providing any proof of existence, and none
of these constraints will be considered as necessary.
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B. Test of a physical implement
In order to give physical existence to a logical func-
tion, the designer looks for an implementation which
corresponds to the specification conditions described by
the graph, and then guarantees the logical functioning of
the implement he has found, for any use which remains
within limits fixed by contract. Conformity of the imple-
ment to the graph is determined by a test.
By test, one must understand that the physical object
is activated by a machine presenting all the input sym-
bols which are necessary to explore the whole graph, that
is to visit all states and to follow all transitions. Only au-
tomata for which this is possible will be considered.
Such notion of test is related to the stability of the
function in time. It forbids any evolution of the graph
during functioning. The state of the automaton changes,
but its graph cannot. One assumes that a future func-
tioning in other environments can be deduced from a cor-
rect functioning at a given time on a test machine. This
leads to introduce a notion of date of test.
The test is actually necessary to define the physical
implement of the automaton. It is indeed out of question
to ensure the functioning of the automaton by a dynamic
description of all its constituents. The test allows to asso-
ciate a characteristic graph to a physical object, without
worrying any more about the internal physical behavior
of the object.
C. Cost of an implement
The cost of an implement will be defined by the com-
plexity, in computation time, of the test program. The
test must check the transition function, and thus all tran-
sitions. The number of transitions is smaller or equal to
the product of the number of states by the number of
input symbols. For a given vocabulary, the number of
transitions thus grows like the number of states. To test
a particular transition, it may be necessary to follow a
part of the graph. At worst, the cost thus grows like the
square of the number of states.
IV. MAXWELL DEMONS
Maxwell demons are examples of physical systems
which behave as automata. One-bit memories, like those
used by Szilard and Landauer, are physical implements
of two-states automata like the one of figure 5.
set to 0
set to 1
set to 0
set to 1
0
1
Figure 5. One-bit memory
On each state do converge two arrows, so that the au-
tomaton is not reversible. Every transition is both the
registration of one bit (initialisation ormeasurement) and
the erasure of the bit previously memorised.
Such a memory allows to realise a Maxwell demon, as
shown on figure 6, which has been derived from Ben-
nett’s interpretation of Szilard demon [12]. This figure
represents a cylinder, closed by two pistons which trap a
molecule, the whole being at a uniform temperature.
of the preceding cycle. Here,
X means one of the two states
indifferently.
The memory contains the value
The separating wall is lowered,
then the side where the molecule
is located is registered in the
memory (R for right, L for left).
Registration of the new value in
the memory erases the old one.
The piston is pushed on the side
which is opposite to the one
work is exchanged.
indicated by the memory: no
The separating wall is raised.
The molecule furnishes work to
energy from the (monothermal)
Then, one comes back to the
beginning of the cycle
the piston and restores its kinetic
heat source.
Two states
memory
X
R
R
R
Movable separating wall
Heat
Figure 6. Szilard demon
One must recall that a simple physical system (with-
out memory), like a trap which would be activated by
the passage of the molecule [13], could not perform as a
Maxwell demon [14]. To act in this manner, it is nec-
essary to register the molecule’s position in order to use
this information at a later time (in figure 6, the third and
fourth steps depend on the second one). Let us note that
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measurement, memorization and erasure are inseparable
and closely linked to the treatment of information spec-
ified by the graph of the memory. The logical function
of the automaton characterises and summarizes the ad-
ditional role played by an observer, like Maxwell demon,
by comparison to a simple physical system. Szilard’s ar-
gument shows that, according to the second principle of
thermodynamics, the automaton must dissipate energy
in the course of its functioning.
Possibilities of memorization and loss of information
cannot be reduced to graphs as simple as the one of figure
5. Convergences are not always associated with symmet-
rical divergences. Nonetheless, we show in next section
how convergences and divergences allow to characterise
the automaton dissipation.
V. LOGICAL DISSIPATION
A notion of logical dissipation, which depends on the
graph of the implement but not on particular physical
characteristics, can be defined.
Let us consider as an example an automaton which is
a little more complex than the one-bit memory, as repre-
sented by figure 7. Let us also consider the following two
words, of ten binary symbols each, which are recognised
by this automaton:
word 1: 0100001010
word 2: 0011100110
These two words correspond to paths in the graph (two
computations) which can be distinguished by choices
made when leaving states B, C and G.
Stop
Start
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
Figure 7. Example of a dissipative automaton
In order to leave one of these three states, the automa-
ton uses the information provided by the input symbol.
One can quantify this information by means of the proba-
bilities of input symbols, that is p0i and p1i the probabili-
ties to leave state i by reading 0 or 1 (with p0i+p1i = 1).
The necessary information for leaving state i, as mea-
sured in bits, is given by [15]:
−p0ilog2p0i − p1ilog2p1i
This expression is equal to one bit if p0i = p1i. It is
equal to zero if the input is indifferent or implicit, that
is, if only one arrow leaves the state in question (in our
example, we have considered that divergenceless transi-
tions are associated with implicit inputs). Words 1 and
2 correspond to the following paths (or computations):
word 1: Start A B C C C C C D F G Stop (7 bits
of choice)
word 2: Start A B E F G A B E F G Stop (4 bits of
choice)
Bold letters (B, C and G) correspond to states which
are left using an input symbol carrying one bit of infor-
mation (considering both input values as equiprobable),
and the quantity of information carried by the input word
corresponding to the computation is indicated in paren-
theses.
The divergent paths when leaving states B, C and G
are determined by the information provided by the input
word. Thus, when the automaton is in one of the states
C, D or E, it keeps track of the way it has left state B.
However, once it has reached or left state F, this infor-
mation is lost. In the spirit of Landauer criterion, the
automaton should dissipate because of this convergence
on state F.
Definition: the logical dissipation (or dissipated in-
formation) is the amount of information which is lost at
convergences. The amount of logical dissipation is eval-
uated on the divergences of the graph.
The logical dissipation depends on the particular input
word within the class of words which are recognised by
the automaton. Its amount is not necessarily of one bit by
binary symbol. One must consider the probability of oc-
curence of this particular word among all possible words.
If this set is made of N equiprobable words, the corre-
sponding information is log2N bits. If the set of words
is infinite, the probability for one word among words of
the same length can be considered. Such a definition of
logical dissipation, as the amount of information carried
by a chain of symbols (or word), agrees with Shannon’s
[15] and Brillouin’s [5] results.
The logical dissipation depends on the automaton. If
the automaton is specialised for a particular output word
r (with no divergence), then the amount of information of
the input word s will vanish and all the necessary infor-
mation to generate r will be contained in the structure of
the graph of the automaton. Such an automaton does not
dissipate. On the contrary, if the automaton is like the
one of figure 5, then the quantity of information carried
by input word s will be equal to the length of the ouput
word r (one bit for each emitted binary symbol). The au-
tomaton of figure 5 thus has a structure which results in
memorizing and shifting the word one step further. Such
an automaton dissipates one bit for each binary symbol
read in input.
One may consider that the difficulty in relating the
amount of input information to dissipation (divergences
to convergences) is at the origin of differences of interpre-
tation for the source of dissipation in Szilard’s experiment
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(the measurement or the erasure). Considering finite au-
tomata allows to conciliate both interpretations. Mea-
surement and erasure can be opposed only if one consid-
ers local characteristics of the graph, and not the whole
graph. Indeed, the graph of figure 5 could be equiva-
lent to an infinite binary tree if the automaton were not
imposed to be finite.
In the following, dissipation will be used for logical
dissipation and will be measured in bits.
Automata involving loops will essentially be consid-
ered. In such a case, when part of the computation (of
the path) is such that the initial and final states are iden-
tical, the logical dissipation is exactly equal to the infor-
mation contained in the corresponding part of the input
word. All information read in input is lost.
VI. MODULAR IMPLEMENTATION OF
AUTOMATA
As seen previously, the cost of the physical implement
of an automaton, as defined by the complexity of the test,
grows as the number of transitions of the automaton,
which itself grows as the number of states (or at worst as
its square). Yet, the number of states of automata used
in practice can be enormous. For instance, the number
of states of an n-bit memory is equal to 2n, while n is
commonly larger than 106 in existing computers. The
time required for testing such a function largely exceeds
the age of the Universe (∼ 3.1017 seconds), even if the
elementary period of the test program is made as small as
Planck time (∼ 5.10−44 second). One can only envisage
to implement such functions if their validation is obtained
from tests of the parts they are made of. But this then
requires the existence of a stable function for these parts.
We shall call modular an implementation which allows
to test the parts separately. Before coming to a more
precise definition, we first give an example which shows
in particular that modularity results from a choice.
A. Example of a choice of implementation: modulo
four counter
Let us assume that one wishes to realise the cyclic mod-
ulo four counter defined by the graph of figure 8.
0
1
2
3
Figure 8. Modulo four counter
Counters of this kind are used to realise frequency di-
viders. Such an automaton does not have any informa-
tion input, but changes its state at each clock pulse. Its
graph does not contain any divergence nor convergence.
Its logical dissipation vanishes and one can imagine to
realise it with a physical dissipation as small as wanted.
Such a physical realisation could be provided by a rotat-
ing wheel, where four sectors representing the four states
would be printed. One easily conceives that such an im-
plementation is only faced with a dissipation related with
friction, which could be diminished with improved tech-
nology and which is not linked to the logical function.
On another hand, a method frequently used by elec-
tronic engineers consists in encoding the state on two
binary digits, memorized in one-bit memories. Let us
describe an example of such an implementation.
Let us first define as an automaton a T-flip-flop, as
shown by figure 9, which provides both symbol and
graph. For each pulse of the clock CK, the preceding
state and the input value T determine a new state for the
memory, which can be known at the outside by means of
the output Q.
T = 0
0
1
T = 0
T = 1
T = 1
T Q
CK
Figure 9. T-flip-flop
If this flip-flop is built and tested separately, it can
then be used as a module (using two copies of it) for im-
plementing the modulo four counter, as shown by figure
10, where the state is binarily encoded on the outputs of
the two flip-flops A and B (A being the least significant
digit).
The graph of this implement, represented on the right
of figure 10, is obtained by opening the connections at
the T -input of the flip-flops. It is the cartesian product of
two graphs of T -flip-flops. Each state transition is associ-
ated with a divergence and a convergence of four arrows,
which corresponds to the fact that the two flip-flops each
possess a T -input which can carry one information bit.
The particular path followed by the modulo four counter
in this graph reduces to the loop drawn as a bold line.
Arrows drawn as ordinary lines are never followed, once
the connections between the flip-flops have been settled.
However, they should be counted when evaluating the
logical dissipation, since the flip-flops are tested indepen-
dently of their connections and the characteristic graph
of each one is not modified by their modular association.
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One is faced here with two possible implement graphs
for the same function, defined by the graph of figure 8.
The first implement (the rotating wheel) has a graph
identical to that of figure 8 and does not dissipate. The
second one (made of two T -flip-flops) has the graph of
figure 10. It is modular and dissipates.
B
A
00 01
1110
1 T Q
CK
T Q
B
A
Two
T -flip-flops
Figure 10. Two-bit counter
B. Modularity and extensivity property of logical
dissipation
Definition: a physical implement of an automaton
will be called modular, if it consists of an association of
subsets (modules) which are physical implements of au-
tomata separately testable, associated through connec-
tions which link the output of one module to inputs of
other modules.
The association is not tested globally, as it is in general
too complex. However, each module is tested separately.
It is the task of the designer to prove that the modular
association effectively realises the required function, from
the functions of the individual modules. This proof will
not be considered here. It could be obtained for instance
through simulation on a Turing machine.
In a modular association, the characteristic graph of
each module is independent of the other modules building
the automaton: it is defined by an independent test. The
modular association does not modify the characteristic
graphs of the modules.
The graph of the modular implement is exhibited by
the test. It is obtained by opening the input connections
of the modules, which means that the latter are indepen-
dently stimulated by the test machine. The graph of the
implement is thus the cartesian product of the graphs of
the modules. The global state is specified by the enumer-
ation of the states of the modules. The number of states
of the graph of the implement is the product of the num-
bers of states of the modules. The transition function of
the implement is the cartesian product of the transition
functions of the modules.
Let us write the transition function for two modules A
and B (generalisation to an arbitrary number of modules
is immediate). State, stimuli and transition functions will
be denoted with the symbol of each module in exponent.
The transition function GAB of the global implement is
defined by:
QABt+1 = (Q
A
t+1, Q
B
t+1) = G
AB(QAt , Q
B
t , S
A
t , S
B
t )
The fact that the transition function of each module is
separately testable (whatever the evolution of the other
module) implies that the transition function of the im-
plement can be written:
GAB(QAt , Q
B
t , S
A
t , S
B
t ) = (G
A(QAt , S
A
t ), G
B(QBt , S
B
t ))
The number of arrows which leave state (QA, QB) is
equal to the product of the numbers of arrows which
leave states QA and QB in the graphs of the separate
modules. And for the arrows which reach a state alike.
Hence, the dissipation of the implement is the sum of the
dissipations of the modules. The logical dissipation thus
appears as an extensive quantity.
Remark: unless being a simple juxtaposition of mod-
ules without communications, a modular implement in-
volves at least one module with an input which is con-
nected to the output of another module and which thus
possesses at least one divergence. As soon as this diver-
gence is associated with a convergence, the latter entails
that the modular implement dissipates.
As an illustration, let us consider again the example of
two T -flip-flops implementing a modulo four counter. As
shown by figure 10, the least significant flip-flop has its
T -input connected to a constant. A simplification would
be to replace this flip-flop by a modulo two counter whose
symbol and graph are represented in figure 11.
0
1
CK
Q
Figure 11. Modulo two counter
The implement of the modulo four counter then be-
comes the one shown by figure 12. In this modular asso-
ciation, the modulo two counter does not dissipate, and
the T -flip-flop is dissipative. The association thus dissi-
pates, which results from the fact that one of the modules
has an input, which is necessary for transfering informa-
tion from one module to the other, if one is to realise a
function less specialised than a simple juxtaposition of
non interacting modules.
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Figure 12. One of the modules does not dissipate
C. Cost of a modular implement
With the definition previously given for the cost, it
is easily seen that the cost of a modular implement is
smaller than the one of a non-modular implement (and in
an exponential way). Indeed, the complexity of the test
for a modular implement is the sum of the complexities
of the tests of the modules and does not grow any more
like the number of states of the global implement.
Modularity allows to decrease specialisation in the
structure of the implement graph, but this entails an in-
crease in the number of arrows and of convergences, and
hence dissipation.
VII. DISSIPATION OF COMPUTATION
In order to discuss dissipation of computation in a gen-
eral way, one can consider Turing machines [16]. Only
deterministic Turing machines will be considered here,
and their physical implementation by means of automata
whose graph is stable in time and testable, which allows
to define a date of test (see section III).
To determine whether implements of Turing machines
must dissipate, one may ask if there can exist a physical
implement which is, from a logical point of view, glob-
ally equivalent to a Turing machine but which does not
dissipate.
Turing’s logical description contains parts which com-
municate: The tape and the head (we shall denote by
”head” all which is not a tape in the machine). This
corresponds to several finite automata:
- one automaton in the head of the machine,
- a juxtaposition of an infinite number of memory cells
in the tape(s). Each cell of a tape is a finite automaton,
whose number of states is at least equal to the number
of symbols in the alphabet.
Two finite automata (the head and one memory cell)
communicate during read/write operations of the head
on the tape, and change their states possibly together.
If the implement of the machine strictly follows this
description, that is if it is an assembly of modules which
reproduce the functions of these parts and which can be
tested separately, one is in the situation of a modular
implementation, and there will be two causes for dissipa-
tion:
- the automaton of a memory cell is finite, although the
number of write operations must not be bounded. Hence,
writing a symbol periodically meets a convergence which
entails a loss of previously memorized information.
- the head automaton can involve convergences in its
graph, which is at least the case for universal Turing
machines, according to the following lemma.
Lemma: the graph of the head automaton of a uni-
versal Turing machine contains at least one convergence.
Demonstration: a universal Turing machine can sim-
ulate any Turing machine, in particular one which is en-
gaged in a computation which does not halt. As its head
automaton is finite, it contains at least one loop. In order
not to involve a convergence, this loop should contain all
the states of the automaton. Its evolution would then
be periodic. But there exist computations which are in-
finite and non periodic. This non-periodicity for a finite
automaton implies the existence of at least one conver-
gence in its graph.
Is modularity necessary?
If one wants to preserve the programmability property,
that is if one wants the machine to be testable inde-
pendently of the program (without testing all possible
programs), then one has to implement the head and the
tape as two independent modules. One can conclude that
the implement of a universal Turing machine is necessar-
ily modular, and that it dissipates proportionally to the
number of computation steps.
A. Finite implements of specialised Turing machines
In practice, implements of Turing machines are finite,
that is their tape is of finite length. Of course, this finite-
ness sets a bound on the complexity of allowed compu-
tations, but all computations with a complexity which is
smaller than a previously fixed bound can be performed,
as it is usually done with computers which are also finite
machines.
Within this framework, programmability still leads to
modularity and dissipation. But if one considers ma-
chines which are specialised for a unique computation,
one can then ask whether a particular computation which
halts can be implemented with a non-dissipative automa-
ton (possibly with a non-modular implement).
If one considers a particular program (a particular IN-
PUT tape) leading to a computation which halts, then
the assembly head + tape is globally equivalent to a lin-
ear non-dissipative automaton as the one of figure 13.
Indeed, as the tape lies inside, it is a finite inputless au-
tomaton which never goes twice through the same state
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(otherwise it would indefinitely come back to this state
and computation would not halt). It is thus clear that
any halting computation can be associated with a non-
dissipative graph.
Start
Stop
Figure 13. Linear automaton
But the necessity for modularity is then entailed by a
size argument on the number of states: a Turing machine
including a tape able to memorize 100 bits contains 2100
states (to be multiplied by the number of states in the
head), which already exceeds the time of tests one can
envisage. Whilst it is a very small size for a memory.
Thus, even for a finite machine, even for a machine
which only performs a single computation (hence spe-
cialised and inputless), modularity is necessary if the
parts are not to exceed a reasonable size for the num-
ber of states.
B. Bennett’s reversible machine
Bennett has proposed a machine whose dissipation is
not linked to computation time and which can be built
as follows: with any Turing machine S (that is with any
head automaton of a Turing machine), one can associate
a reversible Turing machine R which makes any working
tape evolve in the same way as S, but which further mem-
orizes the computation history and then uses the latter
to undo the computation, the whole being deterministic
and reversible [8]. Other examples of simple reversible
Turing machines have been proposed since then (see for
instance [17]). The question is that of logical reversibility
for the global computation (Bennett writes ”the whole
state machine”). Bennett’s proof exhibits for the ma-
chine R a head automaton which can be made explicit
before computation (which only depends on the head au-
tomaton of the machine S and not on the INPUT tape)
and which is able to engage in any computation (on any
tape provided after the date of test of the head).
But Bennett’s conclusions on the logical reversibility
of the global machine (head + tapes) do not explicit a
reversible graph for this machine, which would be inde-
pendent of the INPUT tape and would allow an imple-
mentation which would be testable before computation.
Indeed, only the graph of the head automaton is made
explicit before computation, but only the global machine
(that is the global computation) is reversible. The graph
of the global machine is specialised and depends on the
INPUT tape. It can be made explicit, but this is achieved
by the computation itself (if it halts). Hence, it is only
known at the end of the computation and cannot be the
graph for an implement which is testable before the be-
ginning of computation.
The logical reversibility of the global computation
must not make one believe in the possibility to implement
a non-dissipative machine by reproducing Bennett’s logi-
cal structure, as the division head/tape would necessarily
imply modularity and hence a dissipation proportional to
computation time.
The graphs of the modules taken separately include
convergences although that of the global machine (global
computation) includes none. This is understood by re-
calling that useful information is permuted within head
and tapes and is never lost for the global machine, al-
though it is sometimes lost for some of the modules.
The global machine is a specialised machine which
depends on the INPUT tape. When computation has
halted, its graph has become explicit. It is a linear graph,
like the one of figure 13, whose number of states is equal
to the number of steps of the machineR, that is 4n+4r+5
where n is the number of steps of the machine S, that is
the computation complexity in time, and r is the number
of symbols of the result.
Thus, Bennetts’ construction does not allow to imple-
ment a universal non-dissipative machine, but leads to
construct as many reversible machines as distinct compu-
tations. The physical implementation of such machines
remains, for testability reasons, very strongly limited in
complexity.
VIII. DISCUSSIONS
A. Logical separation
The definition of the physical implement of an automa-
ton through its test implicitly contains the idea that a
logical separation can be made between the inside and
the outside of the automaton, and that exchanges of in-
formation between inside and outside (in both directions)
must follow the channels defined by inputs and outputs.
This means that one should exclude the possibility of
correlations between the physical internal state of the au-
tomaton and its environment, which would have a logical
meaning but would not be linked to exchanges through
inputs/outputs. Physical correlations can nonetheless ex-
ist, as long as they are not involved in the logical function.
Separation between inside and outside is not neces-
sarily the isolation of a connected part of space, which
would be limited by the ”walls” of the black box, but
amounts to functionally isolate a physical system, part
of whose coordinates define the state of the automaton,
the latter knowing its environment only by means of the
information present on its inputs. By definition, such an
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automaton has no knowledge of the origin of the informa-
tion present on its inputs, neither of the use of its ouputs.
Furthermore, its logical dynamics are independent of the
nature of its outside connections. This separation is not
a consequence of physical laws, but is on the contrary
a necessary logical assumption in order to envisage the
faithfulness and testability of implements.
The part played by logic in physics cannot be reduced
to the distinction of some physical systems for realising
logical functions. Automata are also necessary elements
for studying physical systems. Indeed, the description of
physical systems requires to perform particular interac-
tions with them, in order to obtain information on their
state, called measurements. By definition, the informa-
tion provided by the measurement must allow to be mem-
orized and treated by logical systems. Measurements
involve automata, which realise the necessary interface
between physical quantum observables and the observed
values which undergo a classical logical treatment [18].
This characteristic role played by the automaton is par-
ticularly illustrated by Maxwell’s demons.
Logical separation and modularity are fundamental
properties of physical implements of automata, imposed
by testability. They have important consequences for the
physical constitution of automata. They imply that in a
modular implement, the internal connections of the au-
tomaton which are external connections of modules (re-
lating the output of one module to the input of another
module of the same implement) only carry information
which can be tested classically. That is, a modular im-
plement can only reproduce classical sequential functions.
In other words, the non-classical realisations which one
can envisage (for instance exploiting quantum properties
[19]) are necessarily non-modular. Their complexity is
then limited by testability constraints.
B. Description of automata by means of recursive
functions
We have considered that an automaton is defined by
a finite list of states and transitions and that this list is
explicitly given. This restriction is made necessary for
physically constructing and testing the implement.
But from a strictly formal point of view, one can won-
der whether one can envisage to describe the graph by
means of a recursive function. It might then be difficult
to say whether the graph is finite by simply inspecting
its description formula. If the graph is the result of a
computation, undecidability of halting of the computa-
tion will translate into undecidability of the structure
and finiteness of the graph. If the graph computation
halts, this computation has for consequence to make the
graph explicit and thus to allow to construct and test the
implement.
A more delicate situation would arise if the implement
is built during computation with the help of another au-
tomaton (a robot) which puts components together fol-
lowing the instructions of a program. This has been
excluded by our definition which imposes testing before
using. But such a possibility could allow another form
of existence for Bennett’s reversible machine. Indeed,
although it is not explicit before computation, its con-
struction algorithm is known (from the INPUT tape and
the head specified by Bennett) and it is constructed by
the computation. In that case, the analysis of dissipation
cannot be limited to counting divergences and converges
in the final graph, but must also take into account the
graph of the robot assembling the components. Preced-
ing discussions can then be applied to this whole set.
IX. CONCLUSION
We have given, for the implement of a finite automa-
ton, a definition of the logical dissipation which is a func-
tion of its graph.
We have defined the modularity of automata imple-
mentation and shown that dissipation is linked to that
modularity. A computing machine dissipates proportion-
ally to computation time if the machine is programmable
or of a reasonable size, since it is then necessarily mod-
ular. Otherwise, the specialisation of a non-dissipative
machine or the complexity of its test make it incompat-
ible with the universality underlying the notion of com-
putation.
Modularity diminishes specialisation. It allows to
reach more complex and more varied computations with
a more simple test. As a counterpart, it entails dissipa-
tion. Turing machines can be both universal and simple.
On another hand, Bennett’s reversible machine is spe-
cialised or complex to test. Dissipation appears, through
modularity, as the property which allows simple machines
to perform varied computations of an arbitrary complex-
ity.
We have not discussed the physical mechanisms which
can lead to dissipation, neither, a fortiori tried to spec-
ify the value of the conversion coefficient between logi-
cal and physical dissipation. Such a discussion should
be parallelled with a discussion of physical limitations in
the registration of data, in their transmission and their
conservation (limits related to measurement sensitivity,
causality and stability). We have seen that logical dis-
sipation is a necessary condition for implementing some
automata. Conversely, the role played by automata in
measurement, hence in the test, shows the close link be-
tween physical dissipation and the logical separation nec-
essary to the logical functioning of physical implements
of automata.
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